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Abstract
Investigates the relationship between three factors of working memory (storage and processing, relational integration, and
supervision) and four factors of intelligence (reasoning, speed, memory, and creativity) using structural equation models. Relational
integration predicted reasoning ability at least as well as the storage-and-processing construct. Supervision, measured as specific
switch costs, was not related to intelligence, but general switch costs were moderately correlated to the reasoning factor. The results
question the view of working memory as a device for storage and processing, and the executive-attention account of working
memory. They are better explained by theories describing working memory as a system for building relational representations
through temporary bindings between component representations.
© 2008 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
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Measures of working memory capacity (WMC) have
been shown repeatedly to be excellent predictors of
intelligence, in particular reasoning ability (for reviews
see Ackerman, Beier, & Boyle, 2005; Conway, Kane, &
Engle, 2003; Kane, Hambrick, & Conway, 2005;
Oberauer, Schulze, Wilhelm, & Süβ, 2005). We have
proposed a model of the factorial structure of WMC that
distinguishes three cognitive functions: concurrent stor-
age and processing, relational integration (previously
called coordination), and supervision (Oberauer, Süβ,
Wilhelm, & Wittmann, 2003). The first function, con-
current storage and processing, captures the commonly
accepted definition of WMC. It is usually assessed with
complex span tasks in which participants must remem-
ber a number of items over a brief period, and perform a
processing task in between or after encoding the me-
mory items. Relational integration refers to the ability
of building new relations between elements and thereby
creating structural representations (Waltz et al., 1999).
The elements can be held in memory, but can also be
given perceptually. Examples are the construction of a
mental model of a spatial array from a description
(Byrne & Johnson-Laird, 1989), grasping an interaction
from a statistical graph (Halford, Baker, McCredden, &
Bain, 2004), or “seeing” a constellation in a collection of
stars. Supervision refers to the control of cognitive pro-
cesses by goal representations; it includes the prevention
of distraction, the setting of response criteria, and the
shifting of task sets. These control processes are usually
subsumed under the concept of executive functions.
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In a comprehensive factor-analytic study (Oberauer
et al., 2003) we found the storage and processing factor
and the relational-integration factor (called “coordina-
tion capacity” in that paper) to be highly correlated but
distinguishable. Supervision, as measured by a task-set
switching paradigm (Rogers & Monsell, 1995), was
only weakly correlated with the other two factors. This
result led us to suggest that WMC should be concep-
tualized as consisting of two closely related aspects,
concurrent storage and processing and relational in-
tegration; supervision is better regarded as a separate
construct.
The purpose of this article is to investigate how the
two functional factors of WMC and the supervision
factor relate to factors of intelligence. Previous work on
the WMC-intelligence relation has nearly exclusively
used storage-and-processing tasks to measureWMC (for
an exception see Süβ, Oberauer, Wittmann, Wilhelm, &
Schulze, 2002). When defined in this way, WMC can
account for approximately half the variance in tests of
reasoning or fluid intelligence (Kane et al., 2004).
We believe that measuring WMC only through storage-
and-processing tasks is an unfortunate narrowing of the
empirical representation of the construct. One goal of
this article is to redress this unwarranted restriction of
scope.
We predict that the relational-integration factor
contributes to the prediction of reasoning ability over
and above conventional storage-and-processing tasks.
This prediction is justified by two converging theore-
tical arguments. One line of argument starts from an
analysis of demands posed by typical working memory
tasks (Oberauer, 2005b). These tasks require short-term
maintenance of a small set of elements and of relations
between elements. For example, remembering a list
of words in order requires remembering the words, and
each word's relation to a list position. Other tasks re-
quire memory for digits and their relations to spatial
locations (e.g., the “memory updating” tasks used by
Oberauer, Süβ, Schulze, Wilhelm, & Wittmann,
2000). Short-term memory for new, arbitrary relations
requires a mechanism for quickly establishing and up-
dating temporary bindings. Based on experimental work
(Wheeler & Treisman, 2002) and simulations of tem-
porary bindings in neural networks (Raffone & Wolters,
2001) we argue that the brain has a limited capacity for
upholding multiple bindings simultaneously. We believe
that this limiting factor is reflected in working memory
capacity (Oberauer & Kliegl, 2006).
Our second line or argument derives from an analysis
of demands posed by reasoning tasks. We found that
reasoning tasks have in common the requirement to
build new relational representations (Oberauer, Süβ,
Wilhelm, & Sander, 2007). For example, inductive rea-
soning tasks such as series completion require that
people construct a representation of the relations be-
tween elements of the series, and transfer that repre-
sentation to a later segment of the series to generate the
next element. Deductive reasoning tasks require that
people construct mental models of the combined pre-
mises to derive a valid conclusion (Johnson-Laird,
1999). Planning requires the construction of hierarchical
structures of goals and sequential structures of actions.
To construct new relational representations, elements
must be bound to each other, or to argument roles in
relations (Halford, Wilson, & Phillips, 1998). Therefore,
a limit on the number bindings that can be upheld
simultaneously posits a limit on the complexity of new
relational representations, and thereby limits our reason-
ing ability. We believe that that limit underlies the
common variance of WMC tasks and reasoning tests. In
the present study we test the hypothesis that tasks that
measure relational integration directly predict reasoning
ability at least as well as conventional storage-and-
processing tasks.
Our hypothesis about why WMC is closely related to
reasoning can be contrasted with two other popular
views. One is that WMC tasks and reasoning tasks have
in common the requirement of simultaneous storage and
processing of information (e.g., Case, 1985; Daneman
& Carpenter, 1980). To test this view, we compare the
predictive power of relational-integration tasks with a
storage component (thus matching the description of
“simultaneous storage and processing”) with that of
parallel tasks without a storage component. The storage-
and-processing view predicts that only the tasks with a
storage component should be good predictors of rea-
soning, whereas we predict that the storage demand
makes little difference for the predictive power of rela-
tional-integration tasks for reasoning tests.
The other alternative is the hypothesis that WMC and
fluid intelligence both reflect the efficiency of executive
attention, that is, the ability to maintain goals and goal-
relevant information in the face of distraction (Kane &
Engle, 2002). The task-switching paradigm represented
by our supervision factor reflects one aspect of exe-
cutive attention. It does not, in contrast, require the
construction of complex new relations. Thus, whereas
the executive-function view of WMC predicts that the
supervision factor should contribute substantially to the
prediction of reasoning ability, our view does not en-
gender that prediction.
Friedman et al. (2006) have recently found that only
one of three factors reflecting executive functions, the
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one called updating, predicts measures of fluid intelli-
gence. The updating factor is formed by tasks that are
virtually identical to tasks that emerged as markers of
WMC in a psychometric study (Oberauer et al., 2000),
and therefore we regard the updating factor as a WMC
factor. Neither the task-set switching factor nor the in-
hibition factor predicted fluid intelligence in the Friedman
et al. study. We investigate whether this negative result
can be confirmed for task-set switching as a predictor,
using a differentiated set of intelligence factors as criteria.
1. Method
The present data come from the study first reported in
Oberauer et al. (2003). That report focused exclusively
on the structure of WMC.
1.1. Participants
Participants were 135 students from the University of
Mannheim. Their mean age was 25.8 years (SD=3.8),
44% were female. Four participants were excluded due
to missing data.
1.2. Materials and procedure
1.2.1. WMC and supervision tasks
There were four tasks for assessing concurrent storage
and processing (SP), eight tasks for measuring relational
integration (RI), and four tasks for measuring super-
vision (SUP), described in detail in Oberauer et al.
(2003). All tasks were computer based. The SP tasks all
followed the same schema: after sequential presentation
of a variable number of items to be remembered in
correct order, participants worked on an unrelated choice
reaction time (CRT) task for 5 s, trying to complete as
many trials as possible. After that, the memory items
were recalled on an answer sheet. There was one task
using words, one using numbers, and two tasks using
different kinds of visual–spatial material (arrows and
partially filled matrices). The CRT tasks always used
material from the same content domain as the memory
material. Performance was scored by counting the
number of items recalled in their correct positions.
There were four pairs of RI tasks, one usingwords, one
using numbers, and two using visuo-spatial materials.
Each task was realized in a no-memory version, in which
the elements to be integrated were continuously visible on
the screen, and a memory version in which some or all of
the elements were presented only briefly and then had to
be remembered. In the no-memory version of the verbal
task, calledmonitoring-verbal, participants saw one word
in each cell of a 3×3 grid. Every 2 s a randomly chosen
word was replaced by a new word. Participants had to
press the space bar if three words in a row, a column, or a
diagonal rhymed with each other. In the memory version,
the gridwas reduced to a cross with 5 cells, and eachword
was removed after being presented, so that participants
had to remember the last word presented in each cell, and
decide whether these words formed a rhyming row or
column. The numerical tasks, monitoring-numerical,
followed the same procedure. Here, three-digit numbers
were presented instead of the words, and participants had
to press the space bar when they detected a row, column,
or diagonal in which the numbers shared the last digit.
Performance in the monitoring tasks was scored as the
number of hits minus the number of false alarms.
The first spatial task, flight control, involved
monitoring the trajectories of five to nine triangles
(representing airplanes) moving in different directions
across the screen. Whenever one airplane was about to
crash into another plane or a mountain (represented by
brown patches) participants were to stop the video and
redirect one airplane. Each stop came at a small cost, but
each lost airplane incurred a large cost, so that a good
score could be obtained by intervening if and only if
necessary to prevent crashes. In the memory version, the
mountains were displayed only briefly before onset of
the movements in each trial and had to be remembered;
in the no-memory version they remained visible.
Performance was scored by counting the number of
plane crashes (reverse-coded so that higher scores reflect
better performance). For the second spatial task, finding
squares, the screen was covered by a 10×10 grid. In the
no-memory version, between eight and twelve dots were
placed in randomly selected cells. Every 1.5 s two of the
dots moved to randomly selected new locations.
Participants had to press the space bar whenever four
dots formed a square. In the memory version, partici-
pants saw between 6 and 10 dots in a sequence and then
had to decide whether four of them formed a square if
they were visible simultaneously. Performance in the no-
memory version was scored as hits minus false alarms,
and performance in the memory version was the number
of correct decisions across 20 trials.
The RI tasks were all constructed to tap the ability of
mentally building and integrating multiple relations
between given elements (i.e., the rhyming relations or
final-digit identity relation in the monitoring tasks, the
spatial relations between airplanes and mountains in flight
control, the relations between dots in finding squares).
These tasks not only require the detection of pair-wise
relations between given elements, but the integration of
several relations into the representation of a new
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configuration. The manipulation of memory demand
served to investigate whether a demand on the storage
function ofworkingmemorywas a necessary condition for
capturing the source of variance that WMC tasks have in
common with each other and with intelligence measures.
Supervision was assessed by indicators of task-set
switching costs computed from four versions of the
paradigm of Rogers and Monsell (1995). Stimuli were
presented in one quadrant of a 2×2 grid, with successive
stimuli moving clockwise through the grid. Participants
performed one of two speeded two-choice tasks on each
stimulus; one task had to be used for stimuli in the upper
two quadrants and the other for stimuli in the lower two
quadrants. Thereby, every second reaction involved a
task switch. In addition to these mixed-task blocks, the
two tasks were also administered in two separate pure
blocks. Specific switch costs were computed as
difference in log-transformed reaction times (RTs)
between switch and no-switch trials in the mixed blocks.
General switch costs were computed as the difference
between RTs in no-switch trials and mean RTs in the two
corresponding pure blocks (again after log-transforma-
tion of RTs). There was one mixed block and two pure
blocks for each of four types of materials, words,
numbers, arrows, and partially filled matrices.
1.2.2. Intelligence test
We used the test for the Berlin Intelligence Structure
(BIS) model (Jäger, Süβ, & Beauducel, 1997; for an
English description see Süβ & Beauducel, 2005). The
test consists of a large number of different task types,
classified according to two dimensions. On the content
dimension, verbal, numerical, and visual–spatial con-
tents are distinguished. On the functional dimension
there are four factors, reasoning, creativity, memory, and
speed. Each of the 12 cells of the model was tested by
three task types. The task types were administered in an
order that maximizes changes between contents and
functions; each task type consisted of one or two pages
in a booklet and was time limited.
1.2.3. Data treatment
Before computing general and specific switch costs,
RTs from correct responses were logarithmically
transformed, so that switch costs reflect proportional
increases in RTs. Switch costs were then z-transformed
and reverse-coded so that high values reflect better
performance. All scores from the WMC and the BIS
tasks were z-transformed. BIS task scores were
combined into three composite scores for each func-
tional category (i.e., reasoning, creativity, memory, and
Fig. 1. Left side: Structure of SEM model for intelligence. Large ovals represent latent factors, rectangles represent manifest variables, and small
empty ovals represent error terms. Right side: Structure of SEM model for working memory. The factors are storage and processing (SP), relational
integration, and supervision (Sup). The manifest variables are Mon = monitoring task, Fcontr = flight control, Fsq = finding squares, Swi = switch
cost; suffixes: v = verbal, n = numeric, s1 and s2 refer to the two kinds of spatial material. The parameter estimates are for the model with specific
switch costs as manifest variables for supervision, and with composites of memory and no-memory task versions as manifest variables for relational
integration (second column in Table 2).
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speed). Each composite consisted of one task from each
content domain so that content-related variance was
suppressed through aggregation (Wittmann, 1988). These
composites were used as manifest variables in the
structural equation models. For relational integration we
computed four composites by averaging the z-scores from
thememory and the no-memory version of each task type.
Reliability estimates and descriptive statistics of the
WMC data are given in Table 2 of Oberauer et al. (2003).
2. Results
We analyzed the data through a series of structural
equation models (the full correlation matrix is given in
the Appendix A). First, separate measurement models
Table 1
Fit statistics for structural equation models
Model Chi2 (df ) CFI RMSEA SRMR
Intelligence 77 (48) .954 .068 .063
WMC (RI-full, SSwi) 55 (49) .984 .031 .053
WMC (RI-full, GSwi) 53 (49) .988 .025 .057
WMC (RI-no mem, SSwi) 73 (49) .931 .062 .060
WMC (RI-no mem, GSwi) 60 (49) .960 .042 .059
WMC (RI-mem, SSwi) 46 (49) 1.0 0 .049
WMC (RI-mem, GSwi) 54 (49) .984 .027 .060
Intelligence+WMC
(RI-full, SSwi)
318 (229) .925 .055 .069
Intelligence+WMC
(RI-full, GSwi)
321 (229) .919 .056 .068
Intelligence+WMC
(RI-no mem, SSwi)
344 (229) .899 .062 .073
Intelligence+WMC
(RI-no mem, GSwi)
331 (229) .905 .059 .070
Intelligence+WMC
(RI-mem, SSwi)
298 (229) .938 .048 .068
Intelligence+WMC
(RI-mem, GSwi)
319 (229) .917 .055 .068
Note: WMC (SSwi) = working memory capacity model including
supervision factor defined by specific switch costs; WMC (Gswi) =
version with general switch costs. RI-full = relational-integration
factor defined by full set of tasks; RI-no mem = relational-integration
factor defined by no-memory task versions only, RI-mem = relational-
integration factor defined by memory task versions only. Correspond-
ing correlation and regression models had identical fits. CFI =
comparative fit index, recommended to be N .95; RMSEA = root mean
square error of approximation, recommended to be b .06; SRMR =
standardized root mean residual, recommended to be b .08 (Hu &
Bentler, 1999).
Table 2
Loadings of tasks on working memory factors in different model versions
Tasks RI-full GSwi RI-full SSwi RI-no mem, GSwi RI-no mem, SSwi RI-mem, GSwi RI-mem, SSwi
SP-v .52 .46 .52 .52 .52 .51
SP-n .45 .50 .44 .44 .44 .44
SP-s1 .73 .76 .72 .73 .75 .75
SP-s2 .65 .64 .66 .66 .64 .64
Mon-v .69 .58 .62 .62 .71 .69
Mon-n .74 .69 .61 .61 .74 .74
Fcontr .53 .62 .51 .52 .50 .51
Fsq .59 .60 .63 .63 .29 .29
Swi-v .54 .40 .54 .39 .56 .39
Swi-n .75 .77 .74 .76 .74 .77
Swi-s1 .56 .77 .57 .78 .55 .77
Swi-s2 .08 .54 .08 .54 .08 .54
Note: Column headers represent different model versions, specifying the tasks used to define the relational integration and the supervision factor,
respectively; RI = relational integration (full = all tasks, no mem = no-memory tasks, mem = memory tasks), SSwi = specific switch costs, GSwi =
general switch costs. For task labels see Fig. 1.
Table 3
Correlations between latent factors of intelligence and working
memory, and regression weights for working memory factors
predicting intelligence factors
Reasoning Speed Memory Creativity
Correlations
Storage and processing .81 .40 .66 .28
Relational integration (full) .94 .64 .58 .47
RI-no memory .88 .63 .59 .48
RI-memory .92 .51 .52 .40
Supervision (SSwi) (.21) (.13) (.18) (− .17)
Supervision (GSwi) .34 (.15) .34 (.07)
Regression weights WMC→ Intelligence
Storage and processing (.28) (− .18) (.59) (− .17)
Relational integration (full) .71 .80 (.06) .64
Supervision (SSwi) (− .10) (− .05) (− .03) − .33
Supervision (GSwi) (.08) (− .08) (.25) (− .11)
Note: The supervision factor was implemented with either general
switch costs (GSwi) or specific switch costs (SSwi) as indicators. “RI-
no memory” refers to the relational-integration factor using only the
no-memory task versions as indicators; RI-memory is the RI factor
using only the memory task versions. Correlations in parentheses were
not significant at .05 as determined through a bootstrap procedure with
2000 samples (bias-corrected percentile method).
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for intelligence and for the WMC and supervision
variables were established. Intelligence was modeled by
four correlated factors representing the functional
factors of the BIS (Fig. 1, left). The measurement
model for WMC and supervision (Fig. 1, right) was the
one presented in Oberauer et al. (2003). We explored
two ways of specifying the supervision factor, using
either the four general switch cost scores or the four
specific switch costs as indicators. Moreover, we
explored three versions of specifying the RI factor,
one using the composites of memory and no-memory
versions of each task as indicators, one using only
the no-memory versions, and one using only the
memory versions. All six measurement models had
good fits to the data (see Table 1). The loadings of the
six models are presented in Table 2.
We combined the measurement models for intelli-
gence and for WMC to investigate the correlations
between the latent factors of both sides; these correla-
tions are presented in Table 3. The results of these
analyses can be summarized as follows:
Storage and processing (SP) was correlated mostly
with the reasoning factor, replicating earlier results (Süβ
et al., 2002), but also quite substantially with the
memory factor — probably because the SP factor
reflects performance in memory tasks. Relational
integration (RI) was correlated even higher than SP
with reasoning, and substantially also with the other
three intelligence factors. Constraining the model so that
the correlations of SP and RI with reasoning were equal
did not lead to a significant loss of fit (ΔChi2 =2.2,
Δdf=1). Therefore, the correlations of SP and of RI with
reasoning were statistically indistinguishable. They
were both in the upper range of correlations between
measures of WMC and reasoning observed in previous
studies (Kane et al., 2005). Supervision, defined as
specific switch costs, was not correlated significantly
with any intelligence factor. Supervision, defined as
general switch costs, showed a small correlation with
reasoning and with memory.
SP and RI were strongly correlated, and therefore we
investigated whether they contributed independently to
the intelligence factors by running regression models, in
which the correlations were replaced by directed paths
from working memory factors to intelligence factors.
The regression weights are shown in the bottom half of
Table 3. The only significant paths, determined by
bootstrap analysis, were fromRI to reasoning, speed, and
creativity, and from supervision (specific switch costs) to
creativity (with a negative coefficient, reflecting a
suppressor effect). The paths from SP and from super-
vision (specific switch costs) to reasoning could be fixed
to zero without significant loss of fit (ΔChi2 =2.3,
Δdf=2).
Fig. 2. Model correlating residuals (disturbances) of RI and reasoning (dRI = residual of RI; dR = residual of reasoning). The parameter estimates are
for the model with specific switch costs as manifest variables for supervision, and with composites of memory and no-memory task versions as
manifest variables for relational integration.
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We also investigated whether the correlations
between the RI factor and the other factors in the
model were diminished when RI was defined solely
through the no-memory versions of the RI tasks. This RI
factor's correlations with the intelligence factors were
hardly diminished relative to the full RI factor, or relative
to the RI factor defined through only the memory task
versions (see Table 3, rows with “RI-no-memory” and
“RI-memory”, respectively). The correlations of the no-
memory RI factor with SP was somewhat smaller
(r=.65, compared to .78 for the full RI factor), and that
with supervision, defined through general switch costs,
was somewhat larger (r=.40 compared to .31 for the full
RI factor); the correlation with supervision (specific
switch costs) remained unchanged (.28). The RI-
memory factor correlated somewhat higher than the
full RI factor with SP (r=.85), and moderately with
specific switch costs (r=.26) and general switch costs
(r=.20).
Another way of testingwhether the RI factor accounted
for variance in reasoning over and above that accounted for
by SP and Supervision is to compute an RI residual and
relate it to the reasoning factor.1 Fig. 2 represents themodel
structure: RI is predicted by SP and Supervision, and the
disturbance of theRI factor represents the residual variance
of RI that is not shared with SP or with Supervision.
Reasoning is predicted by SP and Supervision. The
residual variance of reasoning is correlated with the
residual of RI. This correlation was large and significant in
all four model versions tested (see Table 4).
Wewere concerned that the high correlation of RI with
reasoning might in part be mediated by shared variance of
processing speed, because the RI tasks all involved some
degree of time pressure. We used an extension of the
model structure of Fig. 2 to test this hypothesis: A factor
representing processing speed was added as a further
predictor of the reasoning factor and of the RI factor,
thereby removing the speed-related variance from the
residuals of both constructs. In one variant, we used the
processing speed factor of the BIS in this function, and in
another variant, we introduced a speed factor defined by
the eight pure blocks of choice RT tasks (i.e., the no-
switching baseline measures of the task-switching tests).
Both variants were applied to the four models in Table 4.
Across the resulting eight models, the correlation between
the reasoning residual and the RI residual ranged from .62
to .86. We conclude that RI and reasoning share a
substantial portion of variance that is neither related to SP
nor to processing speed.
3. Discussion
Our results provide strong evidence for the hypothesis
that the common variance of WMC and reasoning
centrally includes the ability to form new structural
representations (Oberauer et al., 2007). The RI tasks
were explicitly constructed to capture this construct, and
they have proven to be at least as good as dual-task
combinations of storage and concurrent processing in
predicting reasoning. The predictive power of RI was
retained even with tasks that did not require any storage
in the traditional sense of maintaining information that is
no longer perceptually available. SP tasks have so far
dominated psychometric research on WMC. Therefore,
the success of RI tasks is considerable progress in
refining the construct WMC, and in developing a more
profound understanding of individual differences in
reasoning ability. Two further studies following up on
the present one, using the no-memory versions of our RI
tasks, replicated their strong correlation with tests of
reasoning ability (Buehner, Krumm, & Pick, 2005;
Buehner, Krumm, Ziegler, & Pluecken, 2006). In
contrast, supervision, measured by general or specific
switch costs, contributed very little to the explanation of
intelligence. This finding replicates Friedman et al.
Table 4
Test of models with RI-residual as predictor of reasoning
Model version Chi2 (df ) CFI RMSEA SRMR Correlation (SE) ΔChi2
RI-full, Sswi 109.8 (83) .956 .050 .0767 .88 (.19) 12.6
RI-full, GSwi 106.5 (83) .958 .047 .0587 .85 (.28) 9.0
RI-no-memory, SSwi 125.7 (83) .924 .063 .0794 .79 (.36) 11.5
RI-no-memory, GSwi 105.1 (83) .955 .045 .0604 .73 (.33) 6.9
Legend: RI: relational integration; SSwi: supervision factor defined by specific switch costs; GSwi: supervision factor defined by general switch
costs; RI-full: RI factor defined by all RI tasks; RI-no memory: RI factor defined by no-memory tasks only; Correlation = correlation coefficient
between residual of RI and residual of reasoning (with bootstrap standard error); ΔChi2: increase of Chi2 when correlation between residuals is
removed (Δdf=1). All ΔChi2 are significant at pb .01.
1 We thank Roberto Colom for suggesting this analysis.
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(2006) and strengthens our contention that WMC should
not be equated with executive functions.
These findings have far-reaching implications for our
view of working memory and intelligence. The tradi-
tional interpretation of the relationship between working
memory and fluid intelligence or reasoning is that
working memory provides resources for simultaneous
storage and processing, that is, the ability to remember
information not currently present in the environment,
and to manipulate this or other information at the same
time. Both abilities are arguably required in many
complex tasks— for example, remembering intermedi-
ate results while carrying out further operations in multi-
step mental arithmetic tasks (Hitch, 1978). On this
account, however, it is hard to understand why rela-
tional-integration tasks without any demand on storage
should predict reasoning so well. The main difference
between specifying the RI factor through memory task
versions and specifying it through no-memory task
versions was that in the former case, the factor correlated
more with SP, confirming that the variation of memory in
the RI tasks was effective. This variation had little effect,
however, on the RI factor's correlation with reasoning or
the other intelligence factors.We conclude that a demand
on short-term storage is not a necessary feature of a good
measure of WMC. Other research (Colom, Rebollo,
Abad, & Shih, 2006; Oberauer et al., 2000) has already
shown that a processing component is no necessary
feature either. Thus, “simultaneous storage and proces-
sing” is a good description for one effective and very
popular class of tasks used to measure WMC, but it
should not be used to define WMC as a construct.
This is not to say that our RI tasks capture all there is
to the construct WMC, and that SP tasks are redundant.
Rather, we argue that the construct WMC should be
conceptualized in a broader way than before, and
operationalized by a broader set of tasks. The present
RI tasks were intentionally designed to be different from
conventional SP tasks, with the goal to establish a
separate factor of RI besides SP, and to test the hy-
pothesis that despite their dissimilarity with SP tasks, RI
tasks predict reasoning ability. The finding that both our
RI tasks and the SP tasks, despite their superficial dis-
similarity, share a large amount of variance and account
for large amounts of variance in reasoning, raises the
need for a conceptualization of WMC that covers both
kinds of tasks.
One might object— as suggested by one anonymous
reviewer— that our finding of a high correlation between
RI and reasoning is trivial because we predict the criterion
by another instance of the criterion. The argument raised
by the reviewer is twofold: (1) the RI factor correlated
more with reasoning than with SP, and therefore it should
be regarded as part of the reasoning construct rather than
as part of an extended WMC construct, and (2) the RI
tasks involved cognitive components that have been
argued to be involved in reasoning tasks, too, in particular
the detection of relations between given elements, as
captured by Spearman's (1927) notion of “eduction of
relations” and by the “inference” component in Stern-
berg's (1985) componential theory. We believe that both
arguments are unconvincing.
In response to (1) we argue that a variable does not
become part of the reasoning construct simply because it
is highly correlated with a reasoning factor. Constructs
such as reasoning ability and WMC are not just vectors
in factor space, they also have a conceptual meaning.
Reasoning, for instance, is well defined in philosophy
and cognitive psychology as deriving a conclusion from
given information by a rationally justifiable line of
argument; the argument forms are often classified as
deductive, inductive, and abductive (Wilhelm, 2005). If
a variable correlates highly with reasoning ability but
does not match the definition of the construct, it cannot
be argued to represent reasoning. Our monitoring tasks
clearly don't involve inductive, deductive, or abductive
inferences, they don't even involve deriving a conclu-
sion, not to speak of a rational argument. Subsuming
them under the reasoning construct simply because of
their high correlation with reasoning ability would mean
to blame the predictor for its success. In contrast, it is
conceptually fully justified to regard the RI factor as part
of the WMC construct because the RI tasks were
constructed to capture a theoretically justified extension
of the concept of WMC.
In response to (2) we fully acknowledge that others
before us have noticed the central role of relations in
reasoning.2 This does not imply that every task
involving the representation and processing of relations
is by definition a reasoning task— as argued above, the
concept of reasoning involves more than processing of
relations. Representing and processing relations is one
of several characteristics of reasoning tasks— as shown
most clearly by the fact that “inference” is one of several
components Sternberg (1985) assumes to underlie
reasoning performance. Individual differences in all
these characteristics or components could be responsible
2 It is worth mentioning in this context that “eduction of relations”
and the “inference” component in Sternberg's theory refer to the
discovery of relations, a process that lies at the heart of inductive
reasoning but seems to be less involved in deductive reasoning. In
Sternberg's componential theory, “inference” is not among the
components assumed for deductive reasoning.
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for individual differences in reasoning ability, and it is
far from trivial to show that the ability to represent
relations is an important predictor. Moreover, whereas
previous authors highlighted the role of relations, our
hypothesis goes beyond these ideas by emphasizing the
integration of relations. Tasks that only require proces-
sing of individual relations don't qualify as RI tasks and
therefore should not be as good predictors of reasoning
as comparable tasks that require relational integration.
For instance, we predict that tasks such as deciding
which of two numbers is larger, or whether two given
words rhyme, are not as good predictors of reasoning
ability as our RI tasks. In fact, many tasks measuring the
Speed component of the BIS are of this kind, and Speed
correlates less with reasoning than RI does.3
Our findings support a view of working memory
that goes beyond its characterization of a system for
temporary storage and processing. We assume that
working memory primarily serves to integrate infor-
mation — whether perceptually given or memorial —
and construct new relational representations from
them (Halford et al., 2004; Oberauer et al., 2007;
Waltz et al., 1999). Relational representations also
underlie performance in complex tasks such as text
comprehension and reasoning. Building new rela-
tional representations requires a mechanism for tem-
porary binding of the elements that are integrated,
either by binding them to positions in a common
cognitive coordinate system or by binding them di-
rectly to each other. The common denominator of
working memory and other complex tasks such as
reasoning could be the capacity to build and maintain
such bindings (Oberauer, 2005a; Wilhelm & Oberauer,
2006).
This binding hypothesis can also explain why SP
tasks are successful measures of WMC. Typical SP
tasks can be regarded as one instance of relational
integration: Participants usually must report back a
memory list in order, and representing an ordered list
is a special case of a relational representation. Many
contemporary models of serial-order recall represent
order through bindings between each item and its
position on a temporal or ordinal context representa-
tion (e.g., Burgess & Hitch, 1999). Bindings be-
tween memory items and their contexts become
particularly important when other representations not
belonging to the memory set are also highly acti-
vated. For example, in the complex span procedure
(Conway et al., 2005) encoding of memory items
alternates with processing of other material that
should not be recalled. Items to be recalled must be
distinguished from those involved in the processing
task by binding the former but not the latter to a
context representation that serves as a cue for recall.
Likewise, in situations with high proactive interfer-
ence, bindings between the currently relevant memory
items to a context representing the present list is
necessary to distinguish these items from previous, no
longer relevant lists. This explains why immediate-
memory tasks correlate more with measures of WMC
when proactive interference is strong (Bunting, 2006;
Kane & Engle, 2000).
An alternative, widely endorsed view is that WMC
reflects the efficiency of executive attention (Kane &
Engle, 2002). This view could cover the RI tasks by
arguing that relational integration requires the control of
attention such that the elements to be integrated are
3 In a further round of reviews, the anonymous reviewer raised the
following points: (1) The strong relationship between WMC, defined as
SP, and reasoning offers a parsimonious reductionist explanation of
reasoning in terms of a lower-order processing mechanism (i.e., storage
and processing) that does not include relational processing. Including RI
into the concept ofWMC renders theWMC construct more complex and
blurs the boundary betweenWMC and reasoning, because reasoning also
involves relational processing. (2) It can be argued that the relational
processing involved in our RI tasks is very similar to the relational
processing necessary in analogical reasoning tasks such as those used by
Sternberg (1985) to measure the “inference” component (i.e., discovering
the relationship between the first 2 terms of an analogy). (3) The RI factor
may have unique components of variance beyond relational processing,
but that claim would have to be demonstrated more unequivocally.In
response to (1) we point out that recent experimental work is just
beginning to unravel the processes involved in typical SP tasks such as the
complex span task (Barrouillet, Bernardin, & Camos, 2004; Hudjetz &
Oberauer, 2007; Unsworth & Engle, 2007), and the emerging picture is
far from simple. One insight emerging clearly from a careful analysis of
errors on the complex span task is that it involves setting up temporary
bindings between memory list items and representations of their serial
positions (Unsworth&Engle, 2006). Thus, the complex span task already
involves relational processing, among other things, andwe argue that this
is why they correlate highly with reasoning andwith our RI tasks.What is
new about our RI tasks is that they were intentionally constructed to
measure relational integration, and therefore they are arguably purer
measures of what we think is the common source of variance of WMC
and reasoning. In response to (2) we fully agree that discovering the
relation between two terms in an analogy is the same kind of relational
processing as is measured in our RI tasks. Yet we insist thatWMC is not a
limit on processing individual relations but on integrating relations, and
this is what is measured by the RI tasks. Analogy tasks also require
integrating relations, but this is necessary only in the next step, where the
relation between the first two terms is applied to the third term to complete
the analogy — Sternbergs components “mapping” and “application”.
This is why, in our view, analogy tasks correlate with WMC. In response
to (3)we readily concede that the evidence for the construct validity of the
RI tasks asmeasures of relational integration, as opposed to processing of
individual relations, is only preliminary, and it is crucial to follow up our
study with experimental and correlational research testing this claim.
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attended to simultaneously. The executive-attention ac-
count, however, has difficulties in explaining the lack of
a strong relationship between task-set switching and
reasoning, because task-set switching is a prototypical
executive-control task. Kane and Engle (2002, p. 638)
define executive attention as the “capability whereby
memory representations are maintained in a highly
active state in the presence of interference, and these
representations may reflect action plans, goal states, or
task relevant stimuli in the environment”. Task-set
switching requires maintaining one goal state and its
associated action plan highly active in the presence of
interference from the other, currently not relevant goal
state and action plan. General switch costs reflect the
amount of continuous interference from the currently
irrelevant task set, whereas specific switch costs reflect
the efficiency of the executive system in changing
relative levels of activation between the two goal states
and action plans, that is, the efficiency of controlling
attention on a moment-to-moment basis. Thus, task
switching matches perfectly the definition of executive
attention, yet its efficiency correlated only weakly with
other measures of WMC and with reasoning in the
present study.
A modified version of the executive attention view
of Kane and Engle (2002), however, could be
reconciled with the binding hypothesis by making the
following two assumptions: (1) Building and maintain-
ing bindings of multiple elements requires simultaneous
attention to these elements, and (2) WMC reflects the
ability to direct attention to multiple elements at the same
time.
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Appendix A: Correlation table as used for the models
Variable S.1 S.2 S.3 M.1 M.2 M.3 C.1 C.2 C.3 R.1 R.2 R.3 SP-v SP-n SP-s1 SP-s2 Mon-v Mon-n Fcontr Fsq
S.2 .71
S.3 .47 .48
M.1 .35 .40 .39
M.2 .17 .30 .32 .54
M.3 .36 .39 .42 .51 .49
C.1 .49 .44 .29 .23 .15 .18
C.2 .35 .43 .23 .28 .21 .32 .53
C.3 .40 .39 .23 .08 .11 .14 .68 .59
R.1 .46 .41 .45 .46 .17 .28 .28 .20 .25
R.2 .43 .36 .47 .44 .22 .32 .37 .33 .26 .56
R.3 .32 .36 .35 .39 .26 .38 .29 .35 .30 .50 .56
SP-v .24 .22 .44 .32 .35 .25 .02 .15 .05 .32 .37 .41
SP-n .19 .14 .27 .13 .10 .18 .20 .14 .06 .18 .27 .22 .52
SP-s1 .27 .22 .36 .34 .30 .35 .27 .15 .20 .44 .51 .40 .34 .31
SP-s2 .12 .08 .22 .38 .30 .31 .11 .04 .08 .36 .38 .35 .28 .43 .49
Mon-v .33 .32 .42 .37 .23 .34 .31 .34 .17 .47 .62 .43 .27 .21 .35 .22
Mon-n .43 .43 .38 .38 .21 .39 .33 .27 .25 .49 .52 .48 .29 .31 .41 .31 .65
Fcontr .14 .12 .28 .17 .09 .21 .17 .14 .18 .31 .45 .27 .16 .15 .46 .28 .40 .39
Fsq .42 .31 .28 .24 .16 .25 .27 .20 .19 .34 .48 .37 .21 .29 .34 .26 .34 .46 .35
Mon-v-nm .34 .40 .38 .33 .23 .32 .29 .35 .21 .39 .52 .37 .24 .11 .18 .10 .89 .52 .34 .29
Mon-n-nm .40 .43 .35 .32 .16 .37 .28 .22 .22 .39 .35 .35 .14 .28 .24 .22 .54 .87 .28 .40
Fcontr-nm .10 .07 .22 .12 .04 .20 .13 .13 .14 .33 .41 .29 .13 .12 .42 .27 .40 .36 .93 .32
Fsq-nm .34 .27 .19 .28 .26 .29 .27 .25 .23 .36 .48 .35 .23 .27 .38 .31 .34 .47 .40 .77
Mon-v-m .23 .17 .35 .31 .17 .28 .26 .24 .09 .45 .58 .40 .24 .26 .44 .30 .87 .63 .37 .31
Mon-n-m .35 .31 .32 .34 .20 .30 .30 .24 .22 .47 .54 .48 .36 .26 .48 .31 .60 .87 .40 .39
Fcontr-m .15 .15 .30 .18 .13 .19 .19 .14 .19 .25 .42 .21 .18 .15 .44 .25 .35 .37 .93 .33
Fsq-m .30 .21 .24 .09 − .01 .09 .15 .06 .06 .15 .26 .22 .09 .17 .14 .08 .18 .23 .14 .77
SSwi-v − .11 − .17 − .03 − .05 .01 − .05 − .09 − .11 − .14 − .14 − .03 − .11 .03 .01 .14 .09 − .12 − .03 .11 .12
SSwi-n .11 .11 .25 .18 .15 − .03 − .04 − .06 − .12 .07 .15 − .01 .16 .10 .14 .06 .10 .11 .11 .07
SSwi-s1 .05 .06 .19 .14 .12 .05 − .07 − .06 − .16 .16 .18 .15 .25 .14 .18 .15 .11 .24 .22 .18
SSwi-s2 .02 .04 .14 .05 .14 .09 − .04 − .10 − .16 .13 .12 .10 .03 .01 .15 − .01 .18 .19 .11 .07
GSwi-v .07 .10 .03 .17 .01 .15 .04 − .04 .08 .14 .21 .13 − .04 − .09 − .02 .10 .03 .16 .02 .02
(continued on next page)
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(continued)
Variable S.1 S.2 S.3 M.1 M.2 M.3 C.1 C.2 C.3 R.1 R.2 R.3 SP-v SP-n SP-s1 SP-s2 Mon-v Mon-n Fcontr Fsq
GSwi-n .05 .05 .12 .19 .06 .18 .05 .12 .01 .19 .14 .13 .02 − .02 .02 .06 .09 .16 .13 .18
GSwi-s1 .06 .09 .16 .22 .14 .24 .03 .00 − .01 .24 .13 .23 .07 .04 .14 .20 .11 .21 .22 .18
GSwi-s2 .16 .24 .07 .18 .03 .07 .02 .11 − .05 − .02 .01 − .01 − .02 − .11 .02 − .11 .02 .12 − .03 − .03
Variable Mon-v-
nm
Mon-n-
nm
Fcontr-
nm
Fsq-
nm
Mon-v-
m
Mon-n-
m
Fcontr-
m
Fsq-
m
SSwi-
v
SSwi-
n
SSwi-
s1
SSwi-
s2
GSwi-
v
Gswi-
n
Gswi-
s1
Mon-n-nm .47
Fcontr-nm .35 .26
Fsq-nm .32 .42 .39
Mon-v-m .55 .47 .36 .28
Mon-n-m .43 .51 .36 .39 .62
Fcontr-m .28 .25 .73 .34 .34 .39
Fsq-m .12 .19 .09 .17 .19 .21 .17
SSwi-v − .18 − .03 .10 .10 − .02 − .03 .09 .08
SSwi-n .08 .13 .10 .09 .10 .07 .11 .01 .36
SSwi-s1 .07 .26 .24 .15 .12 .16 .16 .12 .26 .59
SSwi-s2 .13 .13 .15 .01 .19 .20 .06 .09 .21 .41 .43
GSwi-v .10 .17 .04 .11 − .05 .10 − .01 − .07 − .12 .12 .08 .15
GSwi-n .17 .16 .14 .15 − .03 .12 .10 .12 − .14 − .13 .08 .15 .42
GSwi-s1 .16 .20 .18 .24 .03 .17 .23 .03 .00 − .05 .00 − .03 .25 .43
GSwi-s2 .02 .14 − .08 − .02 .00 .08 .03 − .02 .02 .07 .09 − .03 .12 − .02 .13
Legend: S = BIS-speed;M = BIS-memory; C = BIS-creativity; R = BIS-reasoning; SP = storage and processing (v = verbal, n = numerical, s = spatial);
Mon =monitoring (v = verbal, n =numerical); Fcontr= flight control, Fsq = finding squares (no suffix: combined memory and no-memory score, nm =
no-memory, m = memory); SSwi = specific switch costs, GSwi =general switch costs (v = verbal, n = numerical, s = spatial).
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